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Discrimination as a Competitive Device: 
The Case of Local Television News
*
 
Local news offers a unique look not only at customer preferences but also at the strategic 
response of firms to these preferences. This paper uses a combination of ratings data and 
newly gathered information on television stations in 25 U.S. markets to examine the 
decisions of competing firms and how customers respond to the journalists who appear on-
air at the different stations in a market. The results indicate that there is a negative correlation 
between the racial, gender, and age composition of competing firms. Moreover, the ratings 
data suggest that the stations with relatively few blacks on-air are catering to the more 
discriminatory customers. While a similar result is found for age and gender, the reverse 
holds for other groups, suggesting possible tastes for diversity for Hispanics and Asians. 
Taken as a whole, the evidence supports a theoretical model in which firms differentiate via 
the characteristics of their employees in response to customer prejudice.   
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friendship.  1 Introduction
Local television news does not seem to ¯t the mold that we economists have
cast for customer discrimination. As Becker (1957) ¯rst demonstrated, the
racial preferences of customers can directly a®ect the marginal revenue product
of labor of di®erent groups and, hence, labor market outcomes. But if, as
several recent papers have suggested (e.g., Kanazawa and Funk, 2001; Holzer and
Ihlanfeldt, 1998; Burdekin and Idson, 1991; Nardinelli and Simon, 1990; Kahn
and Sherer, 1988), consumers prefer not to interact with minority employees,
then why do we see so many blacks, Asians, and Hispanics on the local news?
In 2002 an average of 21 percent of broadcast news employees at local television
stations were minorities versus 12 percent of newspaper journalists and 8 percent
of radio broadcast employees (Papper, 2003; of Newspaper Editors , ASNE).
Given the frequent supposition of prejudice against minorities, it seems strange,
at ¯rst glance, that minorities have greater representation in the more visible
media. Might it be the case that customers actually have a preference for
diversity in some circumstances? Or are other factors at play here?
Casual observations of diversity are not the only source of interest in the
market for local television news. Identifying the presence and extent of cus-
tomer discrimination is not an easy task; it requires either directly or indirectly
¯nding a way to measure the preferences of di®erent labor market agents and
how these attitudes a®ect labor market outcomes. As a result, most studies
of customer discrimination have focused on professional sports, where worker
output and customer demand are easily observable. The evidence from these
studies has varied considerably with the particular sport, time period, and type
of position examined. Gwartney and Haworth (1974) ¯nd that black players
increased attendance at baseball games in the 1950s; Sommers and Quinton
(1982) ¯nd that blacks had an insigni¯cant e®ect on baseball team revenue in
2the 1970s; and Nardinelli and Simon (1990) ¯nd that baseball cards picturing
minority players sell for less than those of white players. Studies of basketball
have tended to ¯nd evidence of discrimination (e.g., Kahn and Sherer, 1988;
Burdekin and Idson, 1991; Kanazawa and Funk, 2001) with the exception of
trading cards for players from the 1970s (Stone and Warren, 1999). Looking at
football quarterbacks, Arcidiacono et al. (2004) ¯nd evidence of customer tastes
for diversity. The disparities in the empirical literature could indicate that the
degree and magnitude of customer discrimination is a®ected by the visibility of
employees and the racial composition of customers and/or employees. Recent
studies of markets in which a large percentage of employees are black tend to ¯nd
evidence of discrimination, while studies in which blacks are not as prevalent or
not as visible are less likely to ¯nd evidence of discrimination.
While they have provided a great deal of empirical evidence, sports markets
may have more than their share of idiosyncracies. Most markets have no more
than one team in any one sport, precluding analysis of the relationship between
the characteristics of ¯rms within a market. Moreover, the consumers of sports
are predominantly male and may not be representative of consumers in general.1
Holzer and Ihlanfeldt (1998) avoid this problem by using special survey data
for businesses in four US cities to match customer characteristics with labor
market outcomes. However, their conclusions are based on estimates made by
the owners of ¯rms about the characteristics of their customer base rather than
on a direct indicator of customer preferences.
Television news presents another window into customer discrimination, both
because employees are visible to customers and because it o®ers a measure of
customer preferences through television ratings. In this paper, I use a combi-
1ESPN, for instance, reports that while 45 percent of TV viewers are male, 77 percent of
its viewers are (2004). Direct comparison to local television news viewers is di±cult because
these audience pro¯les are not made readily available. However, a Pew Research Center
survey found that 61 percent of female respondents and 56 percent of male respondents report
regularly watching local television news, suggesting a more balanced audience (2004) .
3nation of ratings from Nielsen Media Research for November 2003 broadcasts
of local television news in 25 U.S. cities and data on the demographic char-
acteristics of on-air personalities. Because there is evidence of sorting among
stations within a market, with some having a much larger number of minorities
on their newscasts than others, I present a theory demonstrating that customer
discrimination can cause intra-market segregation in which ¯rms select their
racial compositions to cater to certain groups of customers. Then, turning to
the empirical evidence, I examine how the characteristics of station employees
are related to the composition of competing stations as well as of the market
in which it is located, and whether the relationships vary with changes in laws
governing the employment of minorities in broadcast news. Also, using ¯xed
e®ects estimators, I examine how the racial make-up of a station's on-air sta®
a®ects ratings in order to identify and measure customer preferences for di®erent
characteristics including not only race and ethnicity, but also sex and age.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes
the data. Section 3 presents a theoretical model that demonstrates how cus-
tomer preferences can lead to intra-market segregation. Section 4 presents the
econometric model and describes the results. I conclude in Section 5 with a
summary of the ¯ndings.
2 Local television news data
The data used in this study are a combination of local ratings and market
demographics furnished by Nielsen Media Research and station and broadcast
data compiled from a variety of sources. The data can be broken down into
three basic groups: ratings data, biographical data, and station data.
Ratings Data
The ratings data are collected by Nielsen Media Research using electronic meters
4that measure whether a household is tuned in to a particular program minute-
by-minute. Nielsen Media Research aggregates the data to calculate the average
per-minute audience for a show which, in turn, is used to calculate a program's
rating and share. The rating measures the ratio of the average number of
households viewing a program to the number of households that have television
sets (the potential audience). The share measures the ratio of the number of
households viewing a program to the number of households viewing television at
that time. The ratings data used in this paper were compiled by Nielsen Media
Research for the 25 largest \Designated Market Areas" (DMAs) in the United
States.2 They measure the average audience over the month of November 2003
for the di®erent daily local television news broadcasts on FOX, CBS, ABC,
and NBC a±liates in each of the 25 DMAs. Ratings data are used for original
newscasts between 5 a.m. and 12 a.m. local time. Table 1 reports average
ratings and shares for local newscasts in the sample by time of day and part of
week. News broadcasts that begin in the late evening are the most popular, with
an average of 8 percent of T.V. households and 14 percent of households that
are watching television watching a particular news program at this time. These
averages are for one time of day and one station alone, and most cities have at
least 4 stations broadcasting local news in English. Taken together, the ratings
suggest that a large portion of the population watches local television news
broadcasts, an observation corroborated by a Pew Research Center survey in
which 59 percent of respondents reported \regularly" watching and an additional
23 percent reported \sometimes" watching local news (2004).3
2The 25 markets in the data, in order of size, are New York, Los Angeles, Chicago,
Philadelphia, San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose, Boston, Dallas, Washington, D.C., Atlanta,
Detroit, Houston, Seattle-Tacoma, Tampa-St. Petersburg, Minneapolis-St. Paul, Phoenix,
Cleveland-Akron, Miami-Ft. Lauderdale, Denver, Sacramento-Stockton-Modesto, Orlando-
Daytona Beach-Melbourn, St. Louis, Pittsburgh, Baltimore, Portland, OR, and Indianapolis.
3The study showed no large di®erence in local news viewing habits by income, education
levels, or sex. However, older respondents did report watching the news more regularly than
younger respondents and blacks reported watching more regularly than other racial groups.
5Table 1: Average Ratings and Shares
Weekdays Weekends
Local Start Time Rating Share Rating Share
5:00 a.m. {7:59 a.m. 2.9 13 3.5 13
8:00 a.m. {10:59 a.m. 2.5 9 4.3 11
11:00 a.m.{4:59 p.m. 4.2 13 3.9 10
5:00 p.m. {8:59 p.m. 6.4 12 5.5 10
9:00 p.m. {11:59 p.m. 7.9 14 6.7 12
*Shares are reported as whole numbers in accordance with
Nielsen Media Research policy.
Biographical Data
To accompany the ratings data, I collected information from the biographies and
pictures of news teams that nearly every station makes available online and aug-
mented this with information from newspaper reports, news broadcasts, press
releases, and other sources of data on news sta®. Using these sources, I made
detailed notes on the characteristics of each of the thousands of on-air employ-
ees in the sample of stations. On-air jobs were divided into 4 categories: news
anchor, sports anchor, weather anchor, and reporter. Each person's occupation
was noted and the days and times at which the anchors regularly appear were
also collected. Station employees sometimes have more than one of these job
titles. Most commonly, a news anchor for one newscast may also be a general
assignment reporter for others or a sports anchor might also be a sports re-
porter. In these cases, both titles were noted although the more senior position
alone is coded for the purposes of summary statistics.
In addition to position, data were also collected on other characteristics of
the on-air sta®. If available, information was collected on origin (state native or
not), ¯rst year at the station, ¯rst year of paid employment in television news,
total number of stations an employee has worked for, approximate age range
(20{29, 30{39, etc.), and highest degree obtained. Data were also collected on
6the sex, race, hair color,4 and ethnicity of each employee. Measures of race and
ethnicity are obviously subjective. In general, an employee was considered to
be white and non-Hispanic unless there was direct evidence to the contrary. In
the majority of cases it appears that minorities are members of the various large
national associations for minority journalists such as the National Association of
Black Journalists. Membership in such an organization, mention of the person's
race or origin, or clear visual evidence were used to decide if a person is black or
Asian rather than white. \Hispanic" is an ethnic identi¯er rather than a racial
characteristic but, in the interest of simplicity and because nearly all of the
Hispanic journalists in the sample would have also been categorized as \white,"
Hispanics were entered as a separate racial category. As a result, each employee
was classi¯ed as white, black, other, or Hispanic. All other races fall into the
category of \other," which is referred to as \Asian" because of the 125 employees
in this category, 2 were Native American and the remaining 123 were Asian.
Table 2 reports average characteristics of the on-air sta® by race. Inter-
estingly, minorities are more likely than whites to be a news anchor, a highly
visible position. Also, fewer minorities, especially Hispanics and Asians, are
male. Minorities also tend to be younger and more educated than their white
counterparts. A ¯nal interesting pattern is that Hispanics and Asians tend to
have less experience and tenure than whites and blacks, but to have worked
at a similar number of stations, suggesting that they may change jobs more
frequently.
Station Characteristics
In addition to providing ratings data, Nielsen Media Research also furnished
data on the number of people and households in each DMA as well as breaking
4An indicator of whether an employee was blond was created. This is likely just as subjec-
tive a measure as race, but I included it because I was curious to see if there was any evidence
of preference for blonds.
7Table 2: Average Characteristics of On-Air Sta®
White Black Hispanic Asian
news anchor 26.0 43.3 34.2 36.8
weather anchor 15.4 5.8 3.1 3.2
sports anchor 7.2 9.2 3.7 3.2
reporter 51.7 41.7 59.0 56.8
male 64.2 50.4 35.4 22.4
age 42.7 41.7 38.3 35.4
state native 25.0 19.7 42.9 21.6
post-college degree 10.8 18.4 13.0 16.0
years at station 9.2 8.7 6.8 4.9
years in local television news 18.9 18.7 15.8 12.7
number stations worked at 3.6 3.6 3.8 3.8
number of observations 1850 381 161 125
this down by age, sex, and black and Hispanic composition. In order to measure
the Asian composition of the markets, data from the 2000 U.S. Census for each
corresponding metropolitan area were used. Therefore, the average characteris-
tics of each market are known, but ratings and shares were only made available
as aggregate numbers and not broken down by these demographic groups. In
addition, local television listings were used to add information on the number
of stations in each DMA that broadcast local news in English, the number of
stations that broadcast local news in Spanish, and a dummy variable indicating
that the DMA has a 24-hour local news station.
Furthermore, the biographical information for each station was aggregated to
calculate average characteristics of each station's on-air sta® such as the percent
who are black and the average tenure at the station. After matching anchors to
time-slots, indicators of the characteristics of the anchor team that is speci¯c
to each broadcast were also included. However, because reporters do not tend
to appear at regular times, they were not matched to speci¯c broadcasts.
Information was also collected from each station's regional chapter of the
Academy of Television, Arts, and Sciences, which have annual \Emmy Awards"
for their respective regional stations. The awards process requires stations to
8submit news tapes for consideration for each category in which an award is
granted and the station would like to be considered. The tapes are sent to
another regional chapter (there are twenty in all) for review and winners are
selected. There can be one, more than one, or no winner in a particular category.
Emmy awards are used as a proxy for station quality. While the number of
categories and the level of competition di®ers by region, ¯xed e®ects estimators
which compare stations in the same market are used in later analyses, so this
issue does not present a problem. For 23 of the 25 DMAs, data from the 2003
local Emmy awards were used. For New York City and Detroit, which did not
have 2003 Emmy information available, data from the 2004 Emmy awards were
used.
Of the 100 possible stations (4 per each of the 25 DMAs), 12 were dropped
because they did not have local news programming or little or no biographical
information was available, leaving 2;569 biographical observations for 88 sta-
tions across 25 markets. These data were combined with the Nielsen ratings
to leave 762 newscast observations. One observation might be the weekday 6
p.m. news on the NBC a±liate in Atlanta, Georgia, and another might be the
weekend 11 p.m. news on another a±liate in the Seattle-Tacoma area. Each of
these observations includes the show's average rating and share for November
2003 as well as characteristics of the market, demographic characteristics of the
station's on-air employees and the anchors on that particular show, indicators of
the amount of competitive programming at that time, controls for experience,
and indicators of the quality of the station's local news programming. Table A.1
in the appendix presents a summary of all the basic variables in the data set.
The average station has about 29 on-air employees, with an average of 9 news
anchors, 3 weather anchors, 2 sports anchors, and 15 reporters. Twenty-six per-
cent of the on-air employees in this sample are minorities. This is somewhat
larger than the 21 percent reported by Papper (2003) in his summary of the
9Table 3: Proportion of Shows with a Minority Anchor
Minority Minority Minority
Time/Week Part News Anchor Weather Anchor Sports Anchor
morning/mid-day 0.61 0.06 0.96
evening 0.51 0.13 0.40
di®erence* 0.10 -0.06 0.56
weekend 0.47 0.16 0.57
weekday 0.59 0.08 0.71
di®erence* -0.12 0.08 -0.14
*All sample proportion di®erences are signi¯cant at the 10% level.
RTDNA/Ball State University survey of news directors, but that could be ex-
plained by di®erences in samples. Speci¯cally, the sample used here is only the
25 largest markets in the United States while Papper's results are based on more
markets and di®erent methodology.5 It may simply be the case that stations in
larger markets are more diverse than stations in smaller markets. While there is
a large number of minorities appearing on-air at local news stations, the match
between station composition and market demographics is closer for blacks and
Asians than for Hispanics. Local stations have an average of 15 percent black
employees while the average market is 12 percent black and an average of 5
percent Asian employees while the average market is 5 percent Asian. However,
stations have an average of 6 percent Hispanic employees while the average
market is 14 percent Hispanic. The di®erence could be an artifact of methodol-
ogy: Hispanics may have been miscategorized more often than the other racial
groups.6
While minority representation is fairly high, it is frequently suggested that
minority journalists are relegated to the lower-rated time slots.7 For each show,
5The RTNDA survey conducted by Papper asked station managers what percent of their
sta® are minority.
6The basic assumption when identifying either group was that a person was white unless
\proven" otherwise. Under this rule, to be classi¯ed as Hispanic, a person had to have
more than a Spanish surname; he or she had to be a member of an organization of Hispanic
journalists, mention heritage in their biography, or have some other piece of clear evidence.
In the case of blacks and Asians, visual evidence could frequently also be used, making them
less likely to be incorrectly identi¯ed as white.
7For example, an article in the St. Petersburg Times reports that some minority journalists
10indicators were constructed for the presence of at least one minority (black,
Hispanic, or Asian) news anchor, a minority weather anchor, and a minority
sports anchor. Table 3 summarizes the proportion of shows that have a mi-
nority anchor by time (morning/mid-day or evening) and part of week. The
sample proportions suggest that morning news shows are 10 percent more likely
to have at least one minority anchor than are evening newscasts, but that week-
end newscasts are 12 percent less likely than weekday casts to have a minority
anchor. This trend is reversed for minority weather anchors; weekend shows are
more likely to have minority weather anchors, but so are evening shows. The
results for news and weather anchors, therefore, do not o®er consistent evidence
that minorities are segregated to lower-rated slots. However morning and mid-
day shows are 56 percent more likely and weekend shows are 14 percent less
likely to have a minority sports anchor. This trend appears similar to that for
news anchors, but, because many local sporting events take place on weekends,
it is possible that the weekend sportscasts are actually more popular than week-
day sportscasts.8 If this is the case, then it would appear that minority sports
anchors tend to be segregated to lower-rated slots.
While there is no conclusive evidence that minority anchors are segregated
to lower-rated time slots, the possibility of such endogeneity in the relationship
between race and ratings must be addressed. In order to measure the presence
and magnitude of customer racial preferences, it is necessary to see the impact
on ratings of an exogenous change in race. If the race of anchors is also af-
fected by the rating a time slot can generally be expected to get, then estimates
of customer discrimination against minorities could be biased upward. This
possibility will be addressed in the econometric model.
refer to weekends as the \weekend ghetto" (Deggans, 2003).
8The assertion that weekend sportscasts may be more popular than weekday sportscasts
is also supported by station scheduling of sports news and commentary. Local stations that
have special news sections or news shows devoted to sports almost universally broadcast the
additional coverage on weekends rather than weekdays.
11Turning to the market as a whole, the data indicate that there is quite a
bit of competition in the local news market relative, at least, to sports markets
where there is frequently only one home team or only one game being televised
on broadcast television. The average market has 6 stations that broadcast local
news in English and 1 station broadcasting local news in Spanish, and about a
third of the cities have a 24-hour local news station. Additionally, at the time
of any given news broadcast there are an average of 3 broadcasts in English on
the air (not including any broadcasts on 24-hour channels) and 0.3 broadcasts
in Spanish. The presence of competition presents an opportunity to examine
the strategic response of ¯rms to the actions of their rivals.
So far I have shown that stations tend to have a quite a few minorities on-air
and that there is not strong evidence that these minorities are relegated to less
visible positions or time-slots. However, these aggregate statistics mask impor-
tant intra-market di®erences. Table 4 reports the average di®erences between
the largest and smallest station composition variables in a DMA and tests the
hypothesis that this di®erence is equal to 0. For each of the four measures, the
null can strongly be rejected.9 On average, in each DMA the station with the
highest number of minorities has 4 more minorities on sta® than the station
with the lowest. Similarly, the station with the highest minority composition
(pctminority) has 12 percentage points more minorities than the station with
the lowest minority composition. This indicates that the stations within a mar-
ket area do not look alike: one station has signi¯cantly more minorities than
another. Stations may be di®erentiating along racial lines, but there is nothing
9This test of the di®erence in sample proportions relies on a normal approximation of
the binomial distribution. While it presents a simple way to illustrate the variation within
markets, the actual sample sizes here are small enough that the law of large numbers on which
the test relies does not hold. As an alternative, I assumed that the probability of hiring a
black (Hispanic) at each station was equal to the percent of blacks (Hispanics) in the market.
For each market, I then calculated the probability of seeing both a station with the minimum
observed composition and a station with the maximum observed composition. Averaging
the results across markets, this probability was 5.5 percent for blacks and 6.7 percent for
Hispanics. So the results still indicate a signi¯cant di®erence between station composition.
12Table 4: Tests of Within-DMA Station Di®erences
H0 : D sd t-stat P > t
max(no minorities) ¡ min(no minorities) = 0 3:80 2.48 7.65 < 0.001
max(no black) ¡ min(no black) = 0 2:32 1.41 8.25 < 0.001
max(no hisp) ¡ min(no hisp) = 0 1:64 1.66 4.95 < 0.001
max(pctminority) ¡ min(pctminority) = 0 11:98 7.46 8.03 < 0.001
in the existing customer discrimination theory that predicts or explains why
this might happen.
3 Theoretical model of racial di®erentiation in
response to customer discrimination
Basic model
Becker's (1957) well-known model of customer discrimination assumes that cus-
tomers will interact with one employee when they purchase the output of a ¯rm
and that they act as though the price is marked up if that employee is black. He
shows that, in equilibrium, ¯rms will pay a lower wage to black employees and
charge a lower nominal price for their output than for that of white employees.
There is no implication for overall ¯rm composition. In equilibrium, employers
are indi®erent between black and white employees; black employees have a lower
marginal revenue product, but also have a lower marginal cost.
However, the assumptions that support this prediction are not always realis-
tic. In many markets, local news being one, customers cannot interact with only
a black or only a white employee. Rather, a customer will come into contact
with many of a ¯rm's employees. Incorporating this possibility into Becker's
theoretical model, and using some of the tools of models of product di®eren-
tiation, we will see that ¯rms may, in fact, have a preference for the racial
composition of their workforces.
Suppose that there are two possible groups from which a ¯rm can hire em-
13ployees: minorities and non-minorities. Let m 2 [0;1] be the percentage of a
¯rm's workforce that is composed of minorities. There are N consumers who
each purchase one unit of output and have preferences over the racial composi-
tion of a ¯rm so that consumer i behaves as if he paying P + dim for that unit
when he buys it for price P from a ¯rm with racial composition m. The discrim-
ination coe±cient, di, is distributed uniformly over [L, H]. Note in particular
that if L < 0 some consumers have a preference for interacting with minorities.
Assume that there are two ¯rms in this market and that each can choose
the racial composition of its workforce and the price that it will charge for
its output. This set-up is quite similar to that of a Hotelling-type model of
product di®erentiation and will be solved as a two-stage game in which the ¯rms
¯rst choose racial composition simultaneously and then, given the composition
choices, choose prices.10 To solve for the Nash equilibrium, we work in reverse:
we ¯rst see what the equilibrium prices are for ¯xed composition and then solve
for the optimal composition given these prices.
Assume, then, that Firm 1 and Firm 2 have ¯xed racial compositions m1
and m2, respectively, and, without loss of generality, that m1 < m2. Then
consumer i will buy from Firm 1 if p1 + dim1 < p2 + dim2. Relying on the












10There is, however, a key di®erence between the model presented here and a standard
model of product di®erentiation. In the standard set-up, the distribution of customer tastes
lies in the same space on which the ¯rms locate. However, rather than assuming that each
consumer has an ideal employee racial composition and that there is a uniform distribution of
this ideal, I assume that consumers are either prejudiced (di > 0) or not prejudiced (di < 0)
and that it is the intensity of this preference that varies. I ¯nd this speci¯cation to be more
plausible as well as in keeping with previous work on discrimination. Moreover, this model's
prediction of di®erentiation holds for a wide variety of functional forms for the consumer's price
function. A similar prediction is found with a standard di®erentiation model with quadratic












Each ¯rm faces the same constant cost c per unit of output. Then Firm i
chooses its price to maximize total pro¯ts given by
¦i = (pi ¡ c)Di(pi;p¡i): (3)
Maximizing this function for each ¯rm and solving for the Nash equilibrium
prices, we obtain
p¤
1(m1;m2) = c +
1
3
(L ¡ 2H)(m1 ¡ m2) (4)
and
p¤
2(m1;m2) = c +
1
3
(2L ¡ H)(m1 ¡ m2): (5)
Moving to the choice of composition given the optimal prices, each ¯rm will





Noting that in the Stage 1 maximization problem each ¯rm sets Di + (pi ¡




















































So, in equilibrium, m¤
1 = 0 and m¤
2 = 1; that is, Firm 1 will always choose to
have a workforce that is all non-minority while Firm 2 will be made up solely of
minorities. The equilibrium price di®erential will depend on the distribution of
tastes. If L > 0, then Firm 2, which is all minority, will charge a lower price than
Firm 1, which is all white. However, if L and H are su±ciently low (H < ¡L)
so that there is a relatively large number of consumers with preferences for
minorities relative to those who are prejudiced against them, Firm 2 will charge
a higher price than Firm 1.
This model of racial di®erentiation has implications for what we might see
empirically. Firms will want to di®erentiate by racial composition in order to
gain control of certain segments of the market. The equilibrium relationship be-
tween racial composition and demand depends on the distribution of consumer
preferences. In the case where H < ¡L, that is in which there are more con-
sumers who prefer minorities than do not, ¯rms with low minority composition
will charge less and have lower demand than their rivals. But if H > ¡L, that is
if more consumers are prejudiced against minorities than prefer them, then ¯rms
with low minority composition will cater to the most prejudiced consumers and
will charge more and have greater demand than their competitors. Moreover,
the response of demand to changes in ¯rm composition would be di®erent for
the di®erent ¯rm types. For instance, in the case where all consumers are prej-
udiced, we could see a more sharp decline in demand in response to an increase
in minorities for low-minority ¯rms than for high minority ¯rms which cater to
the less-prejudiced customers.
Incorporating costs of altering racial composition
One potential shortcoming of this theoretical model is that the prediction of
16maximal product di®erentiation seems extreme. Given the presence of equal
employment opportunity (EEO) laws and racial di®erentials in labor supply,
it may be quite expensive for ¯rms to di®erentiate completely. To incorporate
this possibility, suppose that Firm i incurs an additional cost of altering its
racial composition from arbitrary level R which might be, for instance, the
racial composition of the market as a whole. This cost could be the result of
increasing the risk of lawsuits under EEO laws or of increasing search costs as
a ¯rm attempts to ¯nd minorities to ¯ll all of its slots. Given quadratic costs
of adjusting racial composition, Firm i's pro¯t function is
¦i = (pi ¡ c)Di(pi;p¡i) ¡ (mi ¡ R)2: (11)
This cost of altering racial composition does not a®ect the demand functions
or ¯rm i's best response price function, but does alter its location decision. Now




























So, if there is a cost of adjusting composition, the ¯rms will di®erentiate, but
not necessarily completely. The equilibrium distance between them depends on


















17So, as the population size, N, grows, the degree of separation increases. How-
ever, the comparative statics for consumer preferences are not straightforward.
The e®ect of changes in L and H on product di®erentiation depends on the size
and sign of L and H.
4 Analysis of Station Composition and Customer
Preferences
I will ¯rst look at ¯rm racial composition to see if the characteristics of competi-
tors are negatively related, and I will then look at the e®ect of these characteris-
tics on demand to see if it is consistent with the model of product di®erentiation.
Racial Composition of Employees
The theoretical model presented in the preceding section suggests that a sta-
tion's racial composition is negatively correlated with the composition of the
other stations in the market. But it can also depend on employer discrimi-
nation and the demographic characteristics of the market. The characteristics
of the market are not so important as a measure of the potential labor pool,
but rather because of how they interact with EEO laws.11 While the rules and
enforcement of EEO laws in the local television industry have changed over
previous decades, since their enactment in 1967, station racial composition has
generally been compared to the composition of the surrounding market.
In order to analyze the determinants of employee composition, I use the
station-level data to estimate random e®ects regressions of racial and gender
composition (pctblack, pcthispanic, pctasian, pctfemale) and age composition
(age, the average age of on-air employees at a station) that allow for possible
correlation of the error terms within markets. Explanatory variables include
11Journalists appear to move easily and frequently between markets. In this sample, the
average journalist has worked at 4 stations and at the average station only a quarter of
employees are natives of that state.
18station and market characteristics.12
A potential concern is that the right-hand-side variable measuring the av-
erage composition of competing stations may be correlated with unobserved
market characteristics. Consider, for instance, the regression for station black
composition:
pctblack = ®1 + dmapctblack®2 + (other stat pctblack)®3 + X®4 + ² (16)
where X contains additional station and market characteristics listed in Ta-
ble 5. The theoretical model predicts that ®3, the coe±cient on the average
composition of competing stations, should be negative. However, any unob-
served market characteristics that in°uence the composition of other stations
should also in°uence the composition of the observed station. For instance, sup-
pose that stations in more educated markets are more likely to hire minorities.
Because education is not observed, ®3 will be biased upward. In fact, any un-
observed market characteristic that in°uences station composition should have
a similar e®ect for all stations. Therefore, to the extent that negative correla-
tion is observed in the presence of unobserved market characteristics, this only
bolsters the results.
However, an endogeneity problem remains due to the fact that racial compo-
sition regressions represent a system for each market in which the composition
of station i is determined by the average composition of the remaining stations
in the market. The appendix presents a brief derivation of the statistical prop-
erties of the estimator of ®3 in such a system. In the case of positive correlation
12A negative binomial count model for the actual number of employees from any one group
was also estimated as was a truncated dependent variable model. Both yielded similar results.
Another possibility is that there is substitution between worker types. That would suggest a
system of equations with endogenous dependent variables, but no instrument suggests itself
for identifying these variables. However, in that case, omitting measures of the station com-
position from the right hand side as done here could lead to bias. If, for instance, black and
Hispanic workers are substitutes, then anything that tends to increase demand for one group
will decrease the demand for the other group. This possibility should be kept in mind when
interpreting the results.
19between the error terms (as seems likely), the probability of rejection for a neg-
ative coe±cient estimate is not overstated. However, it is possible that if the
relationship between station compositions is positive and very large, the ex-
pected value of the estimate could be negative. For this reason, I proceed with
the racial composition regressions but note that, while a signi¯cant negative
estimate is likely to indicate a true negative correlation between composition,
the magnitude of the e®ect will be biased.
Table 5 reports the results of the ¯ve regressions. There is not much evidence
of discrimination by employers. An indicator that a station has a minority
station manager and/or news director, minmanager, was included in order to
see if the race of managers has any relationship with the race of employees. For
instance, white managers may discriminate against black employees while black
managers may not.13 However, the coe±cient is positive and signi¯cant only in
the sex regression, indicating that minority managers are positively correlated
with female employees. An indicator that a station has a female manager was
also included, but the coe±cient is not signi¯cant in any of the regressions.14
It is possible that station managers and news directors do not bear all of the
burden of hiring decisions. But in this case, one would expect that there would
be a positive correlation between the characteristics of managers and on-air sta®
because both are employees subject to the same employer discrimination. That
there is not strong evidence of this only further supports the conclusion that
employer discrimination does not play a role
13Antonovics and Knight (2004), for example, use evidence from tra±c stops in Boston to
show that police o±cers are more likely to conduct a search if the driver is of another race,
suggesting that racial preferences vary by race.
14Because it was especially di±cult to collect information on the characteristics of station
managers, the race of the station manager or news director is only known for 49 of the
88 stations. Hence, the coe±cient on minmanager is actually comparing the impact of a
minority manager relative to a white manager or to a manager of unknown race. This could
be the source of the lack of signi¯cance in the remaining 3 regressions. However, the results
are similar if a dummy indicating that manager race was not observed is included. Because
manager names were more readily available than biographies and pictures, the sex of managers

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































As suggested by the theoretical model, there is a signi¯cant negative re-
lationship between the racial compositions of stations within a market. A 1
percentage point increase in the average percent black at other stations in a
market is correlated with a 0:5 percentage point decrease in a station's own per-
cent black. And a 1 percentage point increase in the average percent Hispanic
at other stations is correlated with a decrease of 1:1 percentage points in own
percent Hispanic. Similar trends hold for sex and age. A 1 percentage point
increase in the average percent female at competing stations is correlated with
a 0:9 percentage point decrease in percent female. And a one year increase in
the average age of employees at competing stations is correlated with an own
average age decrease of four months. While there is no evidence of this sort-
ing for Asian employees, this is also the only one of the categories in which
the market composition is proxied with Census data on the metropolitan area
because Nielsen Media Research did not provide information on Asian market
composition.
The negative correlation between the representation of a group at a station
and at its competitors suggests that there is some intra-market sorting going on
among competing stations. In some markets, this might be the result of a small
pool of potential employees, so that if a ¯rm hires a black employee, the ability of
its competitors to hire one is reduced. However, as mentioned before, television
journalists move frequently between stations and regions, suggesting that even
if a particular market does not have many minorities, that does not mean that
there are no minorities available to hire. Furthermore, with its reputation as a
tough ¯eld to crack, there appears to be no shortage of potential journalists of
15Another way to look for employer discrimination is to control for the corporate owner
of a station. There are 23 corporate owners (such as News Corp., Gannett, Disney, etc.) in
this sample. However, coe±cients on owner indicators were neither individually nor jointly
signi¯cant.
22any race. Hence, it seems likely that results are indicative of racial di®erentiation
by ¯rms.
While the evidence supports sorting among stations, there is also a signif-
icant positive relationship between the racial composition of a market and the
composition of all stations within it. A 1 percentage point increase in the per-
cent of a market's population that is black is correlated with a 1:1 percentage
point increase in the percent black at a station. Similarly, a 1 percentage point
increase in the percent of a market's population that is Hispanic is correlated
with a 0:7 percentage point increase in the percent Hispanic at a station. There
do not, however, appear to be cross-racial e®ects for markets and stations; the
percent black in a market is not signi¯cantly related to the percent Hispanic
at a station and vice versa. Looking at females, there is a large e®ect of the
gender composition of a city on the composition of a station, an especially sur-
prising result given the low variance in dmapctfemale, which only ranges from
50 to 53 percent in this sample. With the exception of age, therefore, it seems
that the characteristics of television journalists are related to the corresponding
characteristics of the market.
As previously mentioned, it is not clear to what extent this ¯nding might
represent the e®ects of labor supply, station response to audience demand, and
the impact of EEO laws. In particular, because of their enforcement by the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC), EEO laws may play an especially
large role in the hiring decisions of local stations. In order to examine this
possibility, I take advantage of several shifts in the provisions and enforcement
of these laws by the FCC.
EEO laws actually encompass a range of congressional acts pertaining to job
discrimination. The ¯rst and most well known is Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, which forbids employers from discriminating based on a variety
of characteristics. In response to this act, the FCC, which oversees the federal
23Table 6: EEO Enforcement Regimes
Regime Time Period Enforcement
Regime 1 1970-1986 Beginning of FCC regulation: Stations submit written
EEO reports to FCC. Stations that did not employ suf-
¯cient numbers of minorities relative to their market
were examined closely at the time of license renewal.
Regime 2 1987-1997 Stricter regulations: FCC shifts emphasis to minority
outreach and recruitment. Stations must submit addi-
tional forms detailing these e®orts and results continue
to be tied to license renewal
Regime 3 1998-1999 No regulations: FCC practices are ruled unconstitu-
tional in 1998 and are suspended.
Regime 4 2000-2003 Fluctuating regulations: FCC tries two sets of rules
that tie EEO compliance to licensing.
licensing of local stations, began requiring stations to submit written reports
summarizing the composition of their employees in 1970. Stations that had 50
or more employees or that did not have su±cient minorities on sta® relative to
the composition of their market were reviewed by the FCC at licensing renewal
time. In 1987 the FCC modi¯ed its policy to place greater weight on recruit-
ment e®orts and, as a result, the amount of required paperwork and monitoring
increased. However, in 1998 the tying of federal licensing to these requirements
was ruled unconstitutional and the FCC suspended its EEO program, leading to
a two year period in which no FCC enforcement was in place. In 2000 the FCC
implemented a new standard but this was also quickly ruled unconstitutional,
leading to another period during which the FCC did not attempt to mandate
or enforce adherence to EEO guidelines. In 2003 the FCC again promulgated
regulations that required stations to submit information on their minority re-
cruitment e®orts and, again, compliance was tied to license renewal. These
changes present several natural \regimes" of EEO laws, summarized in Table 6.
While I do not have data on station racial composition over time, I do
know when most current employees were hired. In order to get an idea of the
importance of FCC enforcement of EEO laws, I estimate a set of regressions of
24the percent of employees who are black and hired during a particular regime
(pct(black ¤ regimej=i)) on market racial composition. The regression is of the
form
pct(black ¤ regimej=i) = dmapctblack¯1 + pct(black ¤ regimej6=i)¯2 + ²: (17)
¯1 measures the relationship between the market composition in 2003 and sta-
tion composition during each regime. ¯2 is included to attempt to minimize
the impact of these regressions being based only on employees who were both
hired during a particular regime and are presently at the station. For instance,
the percent of employees who are black and who were hired before 1987 could
be low because of attrition. In that event, there would be more blacks hired
during later regimes to replace those lost previously, which would be picked up
by the second coe±cient, preventing the impact of the city racial composition
from being biased downward.
Table 7 reports the estimates for ¯1 for regressions where the dependent vari-
able is percent black during each of the 4 regimes, as well as separate regressions
for Hispanics and Asians.16 Looking at the results for blacks, the impact of the
racial composition of a market on the hiring practices of a station increases
between regimes 1 and 2 as FCC enforcement becomes stricter, decreases with
Regime 3 and the period of lax enforcement, and increases again with Regime
4 and the implementation of new rules. The R2 for each of the regressions
for blacks also increases with stricter regimes. A similar trend is evident for
Hispanics and Asians, suggesting that market composition has more power in
explaining station composition during periods of stricter EEO regulations and
enforcement. This evidence, therefore, does indicate that FCC enforcement of
EEO regulations in the local television market has had an impact on station
hiring practices. However, even during recent periods of confusing or absent en-
16Only 2 blacks and no Hispanics or Asians were hired by their station before 1970, so the
analysis does not include the period before 1970
25Table 7: Impact of DMA Composition on Minority Hiring over Time
Blacks Hispanics Asians
dma dma dma




pct(regime1 ¤ race) 0.26 0.14 0.03 0.09 0.05 0.06
pct(regime2 ¤ race) 0.43 0.32 0.20 0.45 0.31 0.24
pct(regime3 ¤ race) 0.21 0.20 0.12 0.31 0.20 0.15
pct(regime4 ¤ race) 0.68 0.40 0.25 0.50 0.43 0.23
*bold coe±cients are signi¯cant at 10% level
forcement, there is still a signi¯cant and positive relationship between the racial
composition of a city and minority hiring at stations, indicating that while it
does place some constraint on stations, EEO enforcement is not the only driving
force behind minority hiring.
Customer Preferences
Ratings regressions measure the e®ect of employee characteristics on customer
demand.17 Regressions are of the form
ratingijt = ® + Sij¯1 + Nijt¯2 + Àijt; (18)
where ratingijt is the rating of show i in market j at time-slot t, Sij is a vector of
containing the characteristics of the station, and Nijt is a vector containing the
characteristics of that particular newscast. It is plausible and indeed, Hausman
speci¯cation tests indicate that there are certain unobserved e®ects that are
particular to a time slot in a given market and are correlated with the regres-
sors. For instance, if minorities are indeed assigned to slots that are expected
to receive low ratings, then the estimated e®ect of racial composition may be
downward biased. In an attempt to account for this possibility, the speci¯cation
incorporates market and time ¯xed e®ects. In other words, the estimates are
17Another option would be to use share as the dependent variable rather than rating.
Because share measures viewership only as a fraction of those watching TV, this would es-
sentially measure preferences conditional on turning the television on at all, while rating is
unconditional on this. If, for instance, customers are prejudiced against blacks and tend not
to watch television when blacks are on, the e®ect of race may be underestimated. In this
instance, the results of regressions using share are only a little smaller than the results from
the ratings regressions.
26based on di®erences in outcomes for newscasts in the same market at the same
time of day (e.g., early morning weekdays, etc.).
Table 8 reports the results for the above model using a matching speci-
¯cation to measure station composition. The racial and gender composition
of a station is measured relative to the same characteristics of the market.18
These weighted variables can be thought of as matching measures; the variables
blackmatch, hispanicmatch, asianmatch and femalematch are the ratios of
station composition to market composition multiplied by 100. So, if blackmatch
is equal to 100, the station exactly matches the black composition of the city
while if blackmatch is less than 100 the station under-represents blacks and if
blackmatch is greater than 100 the station over-represents blacks. Using the
matching speci¯cation allows for the possibility that the e®ect of adding blacks
is di®erent in markets with di®erent racial compositions. In addition to these
variables measuring the overall composition of journalists at a station, there are
also indicators for the sex and minority status of the news, weather, and sports
anchors on the particular newscast being observed.19
Turning to the results, only 2 of the 6 anchor variables, which are matched to
each newscast, are signi¯cant. The signi¯cant estimates suggest that if a male
news anchor is replaced with a female one, ratings decline by 0:61 percentage
points and if a white weather anchor is replaced with a minority one, ratings
decline by 0:51 percentage points. The insigni¯cance of the remaining anchor
variables could indicate that the e®ect of the speci¯c anchors on any one show
is not large; or, it could be a product of the small sample size.
The variables measuring overall station composition, however, do suggest
that customers have preferences for employee characteristics over all of the di-
18Age is not weighted because Nielsen Media Research did not provide detailed age charac-
teristics of markets
19More detailed indicators for anchor team composition were also considered so that,for
instance, a solo white male anchor could be compared to a black male/white female duo and
so on. However, these more detailed indicators were jointly insigni¯cant.
27Table 8: Fixed E®ects Ratings Regressions
dep. variable: average Nielsen rating for November 2003
coef se coef se
Employee Characteristics Anchor Characteristics
pctnative -0.021 0.009 sport anch 1.164 0.287
pcthighed -0.019 0.013 duo -0.203 0.237
tenure 0.369 0.062 trio 1.1x10
¡4 0.504
experience -0.015 0.029 min. anchor 0.178 0.156
no. stations 0.633 0.301 female anchor -0.610 0.356
pctblond 0.122 0.019 min. weather -0.507 0.247
age -18.380 9.245 female weather -0.236 0.173
age
2 0.434 0.224 min. sports 0.229 0.236
age
3 -0.003 0.002 female sports -0.111 0.527
female match 1.149 0.295 Station Characteristics
female match




¡5 CBS 1.468 0.287
black match -0.118 0.018 ABC 2.279 0.280
black match
2 0.001 1.2X10




¡7 pct emmys 0.024 0.004








¡7 no. persons 0.011 0.021








¡8 constant 228.363 125.662
*bold coe±cients are signi¯cant at 10% level
28mensions examined. The coe±cient on pctblond suggests that a 1 percentage
point increase in the percent of employees who are blond yields ratings that are
0:1 percentage points higher.20 Because speci¯cation tests indicate that cubic
functions are appropriate for the remaining composition variables, the match-
ing variables for average station characteristics were entered along with their
squares and cubes. Figure 1 shows the estimated mean of a show's rating con-
ditional on the ¯ve composition variables.21 Looking at the graph for the e®ect
of the match between station percent black and market percent black, ratings
initially decline as black representation at a station increases but, as station
composition begins to exceed market composition, ratings develop a positive
relationship with black composition. A similar result holds for age, although
it appears that the negative e®ect of age diminishes as average age increases
but does not exhibit a strong positive trend. For gender composition, there is a
negative but decreasing e®ect of adding women. The shapes of these functions
are not consistent with Becker's model of customer discrimination in which di-
minishing marginal utility would cause the negative impact of race to increase
with minority representation. They are also not explained by a taste for diver-
sity, since this would suggest that the functions would be concave. However,
the decline in the negative response as composition increases is consistent with
the theory of station di®erentiation in which stations sort in response to cus-
tomer prejudices against blacks, women, and older workers, yielding p1 < p2.
The results for blacks, for example, suggest that those stations with a relatively
low composition of blacks are catering to consumers with a high discrimination
coe±cient, while those stations with more blacks are catering to consumers who
are without such strong prejudice against blacks or even have preferences for
20Interacting hair color with sex did not indicate that there was a signi¯cant di®erence in
how customers respond to blond women relative to blond men. However, the sample of blond
men was much smaller.
21The functions are evaluated over the 10th to 90th percentiles of the independent variables
that are observed in the data.
29them. However, if the black composition variable becomes high enough, ratings
will begin to decline again, suggesting that at very high levels of representation
(when there are more than 2 and a half times as many blacks on the station than
in the market, which is only observed for a few outlying stations and hence not
shown on the domain of the graph), even the less prejudiced consumers begin
to exhibit a strong response.
Turning to the remaining two graphs in Figure 1, the results indicate that
at least some consumers have a preference for Hispanics and Asians. Looking at
Hispanics, ratings increase over low levels of composition but decline with the
addition of more Hispanic employees when hispanicmatch exceeds 60. Similarly
for Asians, ratings increase with Asian representation among employees until
that representation exceeds Asian composition in the market. The concavity of
these functions is not consistent with the model of di®erentiation, but instead
could suggest a taste for diversity in which consumers prefer to see about half as
many Hispanics and about the same number of Asians on television as are in the
market. However, as mentioned earlier, Hispanics may have been categorized
incorrectly more often than other groups. If, for instance, Hispanics employees
in markets with fewer Hispanics were less likely to acknowledge or point out
their ethnicity than were employees in more Hispanic markets, this could bias
the estimates. Finally, stations that broadcast in Spanish or other languages
are not included in this sample. It could simply be the case that these stations
cater to customers with the greatest taste for seeing Hispanic or Asian minority
groups.
In addition to measures of the characteristics of the on-air sta®, indicators
for a female and minority manager were also included in the ratings regressions
as a sort of check on the results. Assuming that managers are much less visi-
ble to customers than the on-air journalists, their race or sex should not have
an e®ect on ratings. However, the estimates suggest a positive and signi¯cant
30Figure 1: E®ects of Employee Compositions on Ratings
31e®ect for female managers and a negative and signi¯cant e®ect for minority
managers. If these managers were visible, the results could indicate some pref-
erence of customers. An alternative explanation might be that there is some
fundamental di®erence in the productivity of the two groups in these positions.
Or perhaps these two groups are assigned to di®erent types of stations, so there
is endogeneity here. In either event, it is possible that the results for the on-
air cast members could also be picking up some e®ect other than strict racial
preferences.
5 Conclusion
Understanding the role and nature of customer discrimination is an important
component of understanding di®erential outcomes in labor markets because,
to the extent that customer preferences drive outcomes, competition will not
necessarily eliminate discrimination. However, empirical studies have tended
to focus on a single market{that for sports{ and, even within this somewhat
limited arena, have provided a variety of ¯ndings.
This chapter presents a look at another labor market and a di®erent group
of employees in order to infer the preferences of customers there. While the
initial motivation was driven by the observation of a high number of minorities
on local television news and by an attempt to see if customers might have pref-
erences for some level of diversity, a closer examination of the local news market
provided evidence of a previously unconsidered phenomenon on the employer
side: local stations appear to be sorting along racial lines. While very few tele-
vision stations are all white (most likely as a result of FCC enforcement of EEO
laws), there is signi¯cant variation in racial composition within a market that is
masked by averages. The theoretical model presented in Section 3 demonstrates
that if customers have a distribution of preferences for the composition of ¯rms,
32¯rms will compete through racial di®erentiation.
The empirical ¯ndings support this model and suggest another layer of com-
plexity to consider with the basic Becker model of customer discrimination.
Local news stations appear to respond to the racial composition of their com-
petitors and to try to di®erentiate themselves by race, age, and sex of their
on-air employees. For three of the ¯ve groups examined, the ratings regressions
indicate that the response of consumers varies with the racial composition of the
¯rms in a manner consistent with the predictions of this model of racial di®eren-
tiation. Viewers of the more \white" stations have a stronger negative reaction
to an increase in blacks than do viewers of the \black" stations, suggesting that
stations with few blacks cater to consumers with a high discrimination coe±-
cient against blacks, while stations with more blacks cater to customers who are
less prejudiced or who prefer blacks. Similarly, viewers of stations with more fe-
males and older employees have a smaller negative response to these groups than
viewers of stations with lower concentrations. While the results for Hispanics
and Asians suggest a customer preference for diversity rather than di®erentia-
tion or strict racial preferences as originally modeled in the literature, it seems
likely that the exclusion of foreign language local news has biased the estimates.
Taken as a whole, the results here suggest that customer discrimination may be
a more complex phenomenon than we have previously considered.
33A Variables
Table A.1: List of Variables
Name Description min max mean
Show Characteristics
rating Nielsen rating for November 2003 0.5 17.4 5.1
share Nielsen share for November 2003 1 33 12
length number of quarter hours that broad-
cast lasts
1 12 2.9
post network indicator that broadcast immedi-
ately follows national network news
0 1 0.19
pre network indicator that broadcast immedi-
ately precedes national network
news
0 1 0.25
weekday indicator that broadcast is on a
weekday
0 1 0.76
weekend indicator that broadcast is on a
weekend
0 1 0.24
early morn indicator that broadcast begins be-
tween 5 a.m. and 7:59 a.m.
0 1 0.33
mid morn indicator that broadcast begins be-
tween 8 a.m. and 10:59 a.m.
0 1 0.03
midday indicator that broadcast begins be-
tween 11 a.m. and 4:59 p.m.
0 1 0.12
early eve indicator that broadcast begins be-
tween 5 p.m. and 5:59 p.m.
0 1 0.29
late eve indicator that broadcast begins be-
tween 9 p.m. and 11:59 p.m.
0 1 0.22
no. english casts number of local newscasts in English
broadcast during show's time slot
1 6 3.1
no. spanish casts number of local newscasts in Span-
ish broadcast during show's time
slot
0 3 0.3
sport anch indicator that broadcast has a
sports anchor
0 1 0.43
minority anchor indicator that broadcast has a mi-
nority news anchor
0 1 0.56
female anchor indicator that broadcast has a fe-
male news anchor
0 1 0.95
minority weather indicator that broadcast has a mi-
nority weather anchor
0 1 0.10
female weather indicator that broadcast has a fe-
male weather anchor
0 1 0.24
minority sports indicator that broadcast has a mi-
nority sports anchor
0 1 0.68




34Name Description min max mean
dma rank market rank by size, 1 being largest 1 25 -
north indicator that dma is in the north 0 1 0.21
south indicator that dma is in the south 0 1 0.35
west indicator that dma is in the west 0 1 0.27
midwest indicator that dma is in the midwest 0 1 0.17
dma pctblack percent of persons in market who
are black
2.2 25.7 12.4
dma pcthispanic percent of persons in market who
are hispanic
0.8 42.4 13.8
dma pctasian percent of persons in MSA who are
asian
1.1 19.4 4.8
dma pctfemale percent of persons in market who
are female
50.2 53.2 51.9
dma pctyoung percent of persons in market aged
2-17
19.4 26.1 23.1
dma pctprime percent of persons in market aged
18-49
40.7 50.8 47.1
english stations number of stations that broadcast
local news in English
4 9 6.2
spanish stations number of stations that broadcast
local news in Spanish
0 5 1.0
24hr stations indicator that there is a 24-hour lo-
cal news channel in market
0 1 0.3
Station Characteristics
NBC indicator that station is NBC a±li-
ate
0 1 0.28
ABC indicator that station is ABC a±li-
ate
0 1 0.24
CBS indicator that station is CBS a±li-
ate
0 1 0.26
FOX indicator that station is FOX a±li-
ate
0 1 0.22
no. persons number of on-air employees 11 45 29.2
age average age of on-air sta® 33.4 48.8 41.5
pctnative percent of on-air sta® that is area
native
0 56.6 25.0
pcthighed percent of on-air sta® with educa-
tion beyond a bachelor's degree
0 39.1 11.7
tenure average sta® tenure at station, in
years
2 15.4 8.3
experience average sta® experience in local tele-
vision news, in years
3.0 27.0 17.6
no. stations average number of stations on-air
sta® have worked at
2.6 4.7 3.6
pct emmys percent of regional emmys for local
news awarded to station
0 84.6 26.3
pctwhite percent of on-air sta® that is white 54.3 100.0 74.2
pctblack percent of on-air sta® that is black 0.0 38.1 15.0
35Name Description min max mean
pcthispanic percent of on-air sta® that is His-
panic
0.0 28.6 5.9
pctasian percent of on-air sta® that is asian
or other(2 of the 125 observations
are \other")
0.0 20.0 4.8
pctfemale percent of on-air sta® that is female 20.0 57.1 41.8
pctblond percent of on-air sta® that is blond 0.0 36.8 15.2
black match pctblack=dmapctblack 0 322.3 132.0
hispanic match pcthispanic=dmapcthispanic 0 193.0 37.3
asian match pctasian=dmapctasian 0.0 584.1 113.2
female match pctfemale=dmapctfemale 39.3 110.0 80.5
min manager indicator that station manager
and/or news director is a minority
0.0 1 0.22
female manager indicator that station manager
and/or news director is female
0.0 1 0.38
other stat pctblack average pctblack for other stations in
DMA
3.1 31.2 15.0
other stat pcthispanic average pcthispanic for other sta-
tions in DMA
0.0 24.2 5.9
otherstat pctasian average pctasian for other stations
in DMA
0.0 17.7 4.8
other stat pctfemale average pctfemalefor other station in
DMA
30.4 51.5 41.8
other stat age average agefor other station in DMA 34.8 46.5 41.5
*Note that the means for the station characteristics weight each station evenly
and the means for the market characteristics weight each market evenly.
36B Properties of the Racial Composition Estima-
tor
Consider the case in which each market has two competing stations, indexed 1
and 2. The racial composition of each, denoted y, can be modeled as a system
of linear equations:
y1 = y2® + ²1 (B.1)
y2 = y1® + ²2: (B.2)















In terms of station 1, the estimator ^ ® is:





Assume symmetry so that V ar(²1) = V ar(²2) = ¾2 and let ½ =
cov(²1;²2)
var(²1) . Then
it can be shown that
^ ® = ® +
(® + ½)(1 ¡ ®2)
1 + ®2 + 2®½
: (B.6)
If the correlation between the error terms can be eliminated such as in the





While the estimator is biased, the sign is expected to be correct. Furthermore,
under the null hypothesis that ® = 0, the estimator is consistent. In the event
that correlation remains, ½ is expected to be positive because any unobserved
market factors that in°uence station composition should in°uence both stations
37similarly. Given ½ ¸ 0, then plim(^ ®) = ½ under the null and the rejection region
is not overstated.
Extending these results to the case of markets in which there are more ¯rms
present, if there are three ¯rms in a market, then
^ ® = ® +
(® + 2½)(1 ¡ ®)(2 + ®)
2 + ®2 + 4®½ + 2½
: (B.8)
If there are four ¯rms in a market, then
^ ® = ® +
(® + 3½)(1 ¡ ®)(3 + ®)
3 + ®2 + 6®½ + 6½
: (B.9)
Again assuming that the correlation between the error terms is eliminated, the
estimate will now be of the correct sign as long as ® < 4 in the case of three ¯rms
and ® < 3 in the case of four. In other words, although the estimator is biased,
the estimate is expected to be of the correct sign unless the true relationship is,
in fact, large and positive, which seems unlikely. For both three and four ¯rms,
it is still the case that the estimator is consistent under the null or that, if the
correlation is positive, the rejection region is at least not overstated.
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